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Accident Record 
• Army accident rates1,  
– Unmanned aircraft: 49 per 100,000 hours 
– Manned aircraft: 4 per 100,000 hours  
• USAF hull-loss rates2:  
– MQ-9: 4 per 100,000 hours flown 
– Manned aircraft: 0.4 per 100,000 hours flown  
• Small civilian RPA: ~ 300 per 100,000 flight hours 
 
 
 
 
1. Prather, C. (2013). Online report of Army aircraft mishaps. Flightfax, 26. Retrieved from www.safety.army.mil 
2. United States Air Force. (2015). Q-9 flight mishap history. Retrieved from http://www.afsec.af.mil/ 
UAS Critical Incident Study: 
Rationale 
• “Tombstone safety” in the  
20th century 
• Lack of data on minor RPAS 
events 
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Major accident 1 
Minor accidents 10 
Reportable incidents 30 
Minor events 600 
UAS Critical Incident Study: Goals 
• Examine the feasibility of a method to collect the 
operational experiences of RPAS pilots  
• Provide independent and complementary data to 
supplement NASA simulations and flight tests  
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UAS Critical Incident Study: Approach 
• Focus groups with 2-3 pilots at a time 
• Participants asked to recall events experienced 
while operating a remotely piloted aircraft 
1. A hazardous situation or error 
2. The rectification of a hazardous situation or error 
• Only reports that can be made public 
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Preliminary Results 
• 23 participants 
• 90 incidents described 
• Weight classes of the remotely piloted aircraft: 
 
 
Aircraft max takeoff weight     # of reports 
Less than 400 lbs       17 
2000-15,000 lbs        60 
Greater than 15,000 lbs      13 
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Problems Mentioned in Reports 
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Example: Lost Link 
“We were flying really far out … about 90 kilometers 
from the antenna. But I passed some random mountain 
peak for about one second and the aircraft went into 
emergency mode. Luckily I had the correct emergency 
mode programmed. If I didn't, I could've lost the 
aircraft.” 
  
UAS Pilot Report 
        
     
Stages of Lost Link 
 
Example: Lost Link Timer 
“The airplane … made many turnarounds due to it 
being out of link then … it would reacquire and … 
return on mission. This affected fuel burn. [So I] set 
time-out feature just short of the actual mission 
duration.” 
 
        UAS Pilot Report 
 
Example: Lack of Sensory Information 
“We fly based on digital gauges. We don't hear or feel 
anything, like RPM changes …. The aircraft is supposed 
to level off, at say, 5,000 ft … As opposed to a real 
aircraft [where] you can feel the airplane leveling off, I 
couldn't determine if it was still climbing until I noticed 
it was 300 ft past its command altitude.” 
 
UAS Pilot Report 
Stale Lost Link 
• Pilot awareness of lost link mission 
• Lost link mission needs regular updating 
• Lost link mission can be a form of “automation 
surprise” 
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Example: Stale Lost Link 
“At the beginning of the flight, the lost link procedure 
was valid, but the procedure was not updated later in 
the flight. At one point, had the lost link procedure 
been activated, it would’ve had the aircraft fly through 
terrain in an attempt to reach the next waypoint. 
However, the aircraft didn’t lose link and the error was 
caught in the handover to the next set of operators.” 
 
 UAS Pilot Report 
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Example: Voice Latency 
“There is a delay between clicking the press-to-talk and 
talking. This is very difficult to manage when in very 
busy airspace, and listening for a gap to talk. 
Sometimes by the time we press the talk button, with 
the satellite delay, the gap is gone and we step on other 
aircraft.”  
  
 
UAS Pilot Report 
 
 
Controls and Displays 
• Some RPS interfaces appear to be particularly 
error-productive  
• Shared payload and flight controls 
• Keyboard and consumer interfaces 
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Example Narrative: Keyboards 
“… an operator placed his manual on top of [the 
keyboard]. Accidently, this activated the GUI. Then more 
pressure was applied through handling the manual, on 
the space bar. As a result, it highlighted and armed, 
through several steps, the flight termination button. 
Luckily, the operator saw the countdown and caught it in 
time to deactivate this command.”  
 
 UAS Pilot Report 
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Example: Data Entry Errors and Slips 
21 
“I went to put the gear down, but instead I 
turned the SAS  [Stability Augmentation 
System] off using the red emergency 
button. The aircraft went into a 20-degree 
bank and 5-degrees nose down. I was able 
to recover the airplane. I had developed 
muscle memory with the activation of the 
SAS disengagement button.”  
 
  UAS Pilot Report 
 
Accessibility of Control Station 
“In manned aircraft it is clear who is in command, but 
with UAS operations, there are multiple people who 
have a sense of responsibility for the aircraft. So when 
there is something that needs attention many people 
run to the GCS [Ground Control Station].” 
 
 
UAS Pilot Report 
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Example: Mode Error during 
Control Station Transfer 
“During preflight, handover checks were being done … 
we had the aircraft engine at idle with the parking brake 
set, but when the radio handover switched to XXX, he 
didn’t have the parking brake set and the power was set 
at 80% ….  The result was the engine revving up, and the 
aircraft jumping its chocks.” 
 
 UAS Pilot Report 
   
 
23 
Example: Unintended Transfer 
“I was preparing to take control of the aircraft from 
[another pilot station]. The transmitters from my GCS 
were accidently left on. When I slewed the directional 
antenna to get the picture of the aircraft (the down link 
info), this automatically gave me control of the aircraft. 
I was not intending to take control of the aircraft at this 
time.” 
 
 UAS Pilot Report 
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Example: Camera View Illusion 
“Depending on how I do the landing …. [the moveable 
sensor camera] …will be used to make sure that we 
clear the turns. But sometimes, the sensor operator 
will move the  camera, which will make it look like I’m 
turning but I’m actually not turning. So I have to 
concentrate and make sure I don’t respond to that 
erroneous camera view.” 
 
 UAS Pilot Report 
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Next Steps 
• Continuing to collect UAS incidents 
• Results are being used to inform design 
guidelines for UAS control stations 
• Incident reports are helping to identify under-
examined topics 
 
Under-examined Topics 
• How should control transfers be managed? 
• What does ATC need to know about each UAS flight? 
• How much voice delay is tolerable?  
• Do remote pilots need experience flying a conventional 
aircraft?  
• How does teleoperation change threat & error management? 
• What information is needed for flight termination decision 
making? 
• How does the accessibility of the GCS change CRM? 
• What maintenance tasks should be permitted while a GCS is 
controlling an aircraft?  
• How do we make the best use of human capabilities in 
teleoperated systems? 
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A Final Thought 
Will there be a convergence between conventional 
aircraft and RPAS? 
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